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An external director opens a confidential board pack. A records administrator changes a retention rule. Both signed in through SSO, but their actions need different permissions and may require different authentication policies. Decide which access events require phishing-resistant authentication, then carry that decision through fallback, recovery, and active sessions.
NIST SP 800-63-4, finalised in July 2025, provides the Digital Identity Guidelines for government systems. Its companion SP 800-63B-4 addresses authentication. Other organisations can use it as a design reference; applicability, contractual requirements, and the chosen assurance level should be explicit.
A manually entered one-time password can be relayed from a convincing phishing page to the real service. NIST's phishing-resistance requirements distinguish that from cryptographic authentication bound to the legitimate verifier or channel. WebAuthn is an example of verifier-name binding. An MFA prompt alone does not establish phishing resistance.
Under NIST's AAL2 requirements, authentication uses two factors and the verifier must offer a phishing-resistant option. Federal agencies must require phishing-resistant authentication for staff, contractors, and partners accessing federal systems. The general option requirement and that federal-use requirement are distinct.
AAL3 requires phishing-resistant authentication with a non-exportable key and other specified controls. A passkey label or an SSO checkbox does not establish that the full deployment meets an assurance level.
NIST's syncable-authenticator guidance allows appropriately configured synced passkeys to support AAL2, subject to its requirements. Synced keys are exportable and cannot satisfy AAL3's non-exportability rule. Evaluate activation factors, key protection, device management, and recovery for the selected authenticator and deployment.
Use an access matrix to make the application policy reviewable. The following is an illustrative design, rather than a NIST rule assigning an assurance level to each document type.
| Access event | Policy and evidence to verify |
|---|---|
| Read an assigned confidential pack | Named identity, required authentication method, current committee membership, permitted pack version, and access outcome. |
| Release materials to an external audience | Authorised publisher, fresh authentication where required, approved recipient set, and release record. |
| Change retention or access policy | Privileged role, enforced phishing-resistant MFA under the chosen policy, review authority, and change history. |
| Deliver a low-risk public document | Approved public classification and a delivery path that exposes only the intended material. |
An email code or expiring link may serve an explicitly accepted delivery workflow, but it should not be presented as phishing-resistant authentication. NIST prohibits email for out-of-band authentication; email-address validation and issued recovery codes have separate treatment in the authenticator requirements. Do not use a delivery convenience to assert NIST assurance.
Validate the identity-provider result and the authentication context needed for the operation.
Apply current role, site, audience, and lifecycle rules on the API and download paths.
Correlate identity, authentication time, policy decision, resource version, and outcome.
NIST's session guidance explains that identity-provider and application sessions end independently. Signing out of the provider does not, by itself, end every application session. An access token also does not prove the user's continued presence. Define reauthentication, application-session expiry, token handling, and revocation together.
Test an already-open browser and an existing download URL after removing an account or permission. Measure the time until access stops against the agreed policy. Include issued file links, caches, and downstream copies in that assessment; blocking a future download does not recall a file already obtained by a recipient.
Suppose a director must read the approved pack before tomorrow's meeting, but has lost the device used to authenticate. The organisation requires phishing-resistant MFA for confidential pack access. Treat the urgent request as a recovery workflow with an accountable owner.
Use the identity service's documented recovery route. Record the support case and responsible reviewer; do not create a mailbox-only exception that silently bypasses the required sign-in policy.
Invalidate the lost authenticator as appropriate, complete replacement enrolment, and test the required authentication method. Check the subscriber notification and the resulting authentication evidence.
Confirm the director still belongs to the relevant committee and receives only its approved pack. Recovery restores an identity path; it does not grant a new committee role.
Verify the agreed outcome for the lost device's session, existing tokens, and previously issued links. Retain the recovery decision and access-test results without storing secrets or recovery codes in the case record.
NIST's authenticator-event guidance defines recovery methods, requirements by assurance level, and subscriber notifications. Plan backup authenticators and recovery before an urgent meeting. The example above is an operational walkthrough, not a substitute for those requirements.
Choose the authentication strength for the action and audience, then verify it through recovery, session changes, and direct access paths. Keep the authenticated identity connected to current document permissions and a reviewable decision record.
Technical sources reviewed: November 12, 2026, against NIST SP 800-63-4 and SP 800-63B-4. NIST's Implementation Resource Hub provides additional guidance and conformance resources.
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